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ABSTRACT
Joe Simon once said that “we always felt, we wuz robbed.” He is not alone. This article will discuss
Jack Kirby’s estate’s case against Marvel and how the current state of the law robs creators of the
rights to their own works. The evaluation of case law will show that the application of the ‘instance
and expense’ test creates an injustice of inconsistent results in litigation, where creators attempt to
regain control of their works. If the court continues to inconsistently apply the law to these
work-for-hire cases, then the Supreme Court or Congress needs to address the intended purpose of
this section of the Copyright Act. As this article will address, it is troubling to see a continuous strain
of inconsistent decisions coming from our court system. This problem needs to be addressed and
inevitably needs to be resolved.

Copyright © 2014 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Thomas M. Deahl II, The Consistently Inconsistent "Instance and Expense" Test:
An Injustice to Comic Books, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91 (2014).

THE CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT "INSTANCE AND EXPENSE" TEST: AN
INJUSTICE TO COMIC BOOKS
THOMAS M. DEAHL II
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 92

II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 93

A. A Brief History of Copyright Law ...................................................................... 93
B. Jack Kirby and Marvel ....................................................................................... 95
C. Argument In Favor of Petition ........................................................................... 97

III. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 100
A. ‘Instance and Expense’ and Case Law ............................................................. 100
B. Consistently Inconsistent Outcomes ................................................................ 104

IV. PROPOSAL .................................................................................................................. 107

A. Setting a Standard for the Future ................................................................... 107
B. Applying the New Standard to Kirby’s Case ................................................... 109
C. Congressional Action ........................................................................................ 110

V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 111

91

[14:91 2014]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

92

THE CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT "INSTANCE AND EXPENSE" TEST: AN
INJUSTICE TO COMIC BOOKS
THOMAS M. DEAHL II *
I. INTRODUCTION
Quoting boxing promoter, Joe Jacobs, legendary comic creator, Joe Simon, stated
that “we always felt ‘we wuz robbed.’” 1 For years since its inception, the Copyright Act
of 1976 2 gave rise to a new wave of litigation in the realm of comic books with suits
brought by creators to regain their copyrights. 3 One such example is a suit brought by
the heirs of Jack Kirby 4 to regain the renewal rights 5 of various characters Kirby
created. 6 This case was recently petitioned for writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme
Court to reverse the decision of the Second Circuit Court. 7
This Comment will initially discuss, in Part I the evolution of the Copyright Act
from the Constitution 8 to the 1909 Act 9 to the current legislation. 10 Part II will go into
an examination of case law discussing the work-for-hire 11 exception of the Copyright
Act. Part III will examine and compare Marvel Characters Inc. v. Kirby 12 and the same
court’s decision in Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon. 13 Part IV will discuss the petition
for writ of certiorari, in Kirby’s case and amicus curiae briefs in support of the
petitioner. This article will conclude with a proposal that the Supreme Court needs to
make a decision on this matter and if the Court fails to acknowledge this case, Congress

© Thomas M. Deahl II 2014. Author Bio.
George Gene Gustines, A Creator of Captain America, Fighting On, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/books/16gust.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012).
3 See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002)(stating that artist and creator,
Joe Simon sought to terminate the transfer of his copyright for Captain America); Gary Friedrich
Enters., LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc, 716 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2013)(showing that Friedrich, the artist,
attempted to regain renewal rights for his creation of Ghost Rider).
4 Marvel Characters Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
5 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2012).
6 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 125 (reciting that Kirby’s estate alleged that Kirby created and owned the
rights to characters such as Spider-Man, X-Men, the Fantastic Four, the Incredible Hulk and Thor).
7 Allissa Wickman, High Court Urged To Review Marvel Copyright Row, Apr. 2, 2014. See Kirby,
726 F.3d at 143 (stating that the court held that Kirby’s creation of comic books for Marvel were worksmade-for-hire, because they “were made at Marvel’s instance and expense, and [Jack Kirby] had no
agreement to the contrary”).
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9 17 U.S.C § 24 (1909 Act)
10 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012).
11 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2012).
12 726 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013).
13 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
*
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must enact new legislation to advance the true purpose of the Copyright Law, as it has
in the past.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Copyright Law
The founders of this country acknowledged the necessity of regulating the arts
and sciences by granting Congress the power to enact laws regarding copyright. 14 In
1790, Congress enacted legislation giving an author copyright protection for an initial
period and an option to renew that protection. 15 To further protect creators, Congress,
in 1909, extended the duration of the copyright. 16 Further, Congress intended for this
legislation to even the playing field, by increasing the bargaining rights of authors. 17
However, this intent was thwarted by the Supreme Court’s holding that an author can
contract away his renewal rights during the first term of the copyright. 18
Yet again, Congress went to the drawing board to create a law that would level
the playing field for these authors. 19 To “safeguard authors against unremunerative
transfers,” 20 Congress created the termination of transfer provision, which could not

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power “to promote the progress of science and
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries”).
15 Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990)(citing Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, which was
explaining that the renewal term was initially meant to be an extension of the original copyright
period that could be renewed by the creator’s estate).
16 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909).
17 See Steward, 495 U.S. at 218 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222 at 14 (1909) “it not infrequently
happens that the author sells his copyright to a publisher for comparatively a small sum”).
18 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). After the copyright to the
song “When Irish Eyes are Smiling” was obtained, the authors assigned their rights to Witmark,
including the renewal term. Id. at 645-46. One of the authors attempted to renew his rights and
Witmark sued for an injunction. Id. at 646. The Court held that the renewal term was assignable
during the initial term. Id. at 659.
19 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740. See Mills Music v.
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985)(defining that the termination of transfer provision was meant to
give “added benefits to authors…intended to make the rewards for the creativity of authors more
substantial); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that though
copyright law aims at rewarding creators for their creativity, the ultimate goal is “to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good”). 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2004)(explaining that “the fruits of an author’s labor seem to be no less deserving
of the privileges and status of ‘property’ than are the more tangible creative efforts of other laborers.”).
20 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124. See generally 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (2004)(showing the incapability of measuring potential success and the need for
a second chance).
14
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be contracted away. 21 Congress added the language “notwithstanding an agreement
to the contrary” to assure that these rights would not be contracted away. 22 It is clear
that Congressional intent in enacting the 1976 Act was to place these authors in a
better position than they had been in the past. 23
Though Congress enacted legislation that gave power back to authors, if the work
was created on a work-for-hire basis, there is no right to terminate transfers. 24 The
1909 Act defined “the term ‘author’… [as] an employer in the case of works made for
hire.” 25 However, the 1909 Act did not define what “employer” or “works made for hire”
were, leaving this determination to the courts. 26 This was meant to give employers’
copyright protection for work done by their employees. 27 However, the term
“employer” was extended to encompass “works commissioned from independent
contractors” 28 and, eventually, to encompass works that “the hiring party…had the
right to control and supervise.” 29 These rationales gave birth to the presumptive
“instance and expense test.” 30 The instance and expense test is satisfied when “the
17 U.S.C. § 304(c). See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 778 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that “the
provision ‘protect[s] the property rights of widows and children in copyrights’ by granting them the
power to undo earlier transfers and to enjoy the remainder of the copyright term”)); Mills Music, 469
U.S. at 172-73 (stating that “the termination right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the
consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the author had a
fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124
(reasoning that by not allowing the second term to be contracted away, Congress meant to benefit
authors by allowing them to regain power through the extended period).
22 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
See Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir.
2002)(providing that the purpose was to “prevent authors from waiving their termination right by
contract”); Steward, 495 U.S. at 230 (holding that Congressional intent was to provide “an inalienable
termination right”).
23 Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 172-73.
24 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
25 Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Show, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1975)(quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 26 (repealed 1976)).
26 Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 304(c)(defining the ‘work-for-hire’ relationship, to include independent contractors if they
enter a contract as a ‘work-for-hire’).
27 Id. (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(1)(a)(i)).
28 Id. (citing Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965)).
29 Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(1)(a)(i)).
30 Lin-Brook, 352 F.2d at 300. “When one person engages another…to produce a work of an
artistic nature…the presumption arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to the
copyright shall be in the person whose instance and expense the work is done.” See also Brattleboro
Pub. Co. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966)(holding that the copyright vests “in
the person at whose instance and expense the work is done”); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457
F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (2d Cir. 1972)(concluding that the work was commissioned by the employer,
employer had the right to direct and supervise, and the employer paid for the work, giving the
employer the copyright).
21
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motivating factor in producing the work was the” 31 inducement by the employer and
“the employer [has the right] to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer
performs his work.” 32
B. Jack Kirby and Marvel
The ‘instance and expense test’ is the crux of the Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby
case, whether the works done by Kirby are works made for hire. 33 Jack Kirby created
some of Marvel’s most profound and profitable characters, such as The X-Men, Thor,
the Incredible Hulk and the Fantastic Four, 34 which revolutionized the industry. 35
There is no dispute that Kirby operated as an independent contractor during his time
with Marvel, 36 “not [as] a formal employee.” 37 Further, “Stan Lee was free to reject
Kirby’s drawing…[and for] accepted drawings, [Marvel] would pay…at a per page
rate.” 38 Kirby even “worked…out of the basement of his home, set his own hours, paid
his own overhead and all expenses of creating and selling his work, which Marvel did
not reimburse.” 39 Stan Lee even stated “that Kirby had a freer hand…than did
comparable artists.” 40 The Second Circuit recognized that “Kirby made many of the
Picture Music, 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)(citing Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill
Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966).
32 Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216 (quoting Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn,
Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968). See also Yardley v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939)(stating that when a party “is solicited by a patron to execute
a commission for pay, the presumption should be indulged that the patron desires to control
publication of copies and that the artist consents that he may, unless by the terms of the contract…the
artist has reserved the copyright to himself”); Siegel v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc. 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036,
1057 (C.D. Cal. 2009)(looking at who prompted the work, whether the hiring party could control or
direct the employer and at whose expense was it created); Siegel v. National Periodical Publ’ns, Inc.,
508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974)(looking at what was the primary motivating factor of the work).
33 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 137 (2d Cir. 2013).
34 Id. at 125. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 10 (filed Mar.
21, 2014).
35 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 125.
36 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Works By Comic Book Artist Jack Kirby Were Works Made
For Hire Under 1909 Act, 82 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 538. (Aug. 2011)(stating that
Kirby started at Timely, Marvel’s predecessor, in the 1940’s and returned to Marvel from 1961-70 and
again from 1976-78).
37 Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 10 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
38 Id.
39 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 10-11 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See Kirby, 126 F.3d at
125-26.
40 Id. at 126. Brief for Mark Evanier, John Morrow, and Pen Center USA as Amicus Curiae at
10. The Marvel Method is quite different from the way other comic book companies produce and create
comic books. Id. “Sometimes [Stan] Lee would come up with the basic idea, sometimes the artist
would come up with the idea, and sometimes the idea would be collaborative.” Id. After these
collaborative meetings, “the artist would return to his own studio…and draw out the entire comic in
31
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creative contributions, often thinking up and drawing characters on his own,
influencing plotting, or pitching fresh ideas.” 41 The first time these parties entered
into a formal agreement was on June 5, 1972. 42 This agreement assigned “any and all
right, title, and interest [that Kirby] may have or control” to Marvel. 43
In 2009, Kirby’s heirs filed a notice to terminate copyright transfers on 262
works, 44 created between 1958-63. 45 Following notice, Marvel sued for a declaratory
judgment contesting that Kirby’s works were created as “works made for hire” and
therefore had no termination rights. 46 Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals found that the works created by Kirby were works made for hire, under the
“instance and expense” test. 47
This case paints an interesting picture because eleven years earlier, in Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 48 the same court did not apply the instance and expense test
in a similar fact scenario. In this case, Joe Simon, the creator of Captain America,
claimed to create this character as an independent contractor. 49 Further, there was
no prior written agreement between Simon and Marvel, but he was paid a fixed page
rate, plus profits. 50 There was, however a settlement agreement entered in 1969,
where Simon acknowledged that Captain America “was done as an employee for
hire.” 51 However, as previously mentioned, the Second Circuit did not apply the
‘instance and expense test,’ but looked at “the legislative intent and purpose of § 304(c)
of the 1976 Act.” 52 As advanced by Marc Toberoff, the attorney for Kirby, the court
stated that “when the terms of a statute are ambiguous…[the court] may seek guidance

pencil, deciding what the action should be in each panel and working out the actual storyline.” Id.
However, this process was quite different with Kirby. Id. “With Kirby, Lee would frequently offer
just a bare-bones concept, or the name of a character, and sometimes not even that.” Id. Most of the
time, Kirby “would…invent new characters where needed, he would write extensive margin notes.”
Id.
41 Id. at 126-27.
42 Marvel Worldwide, Inv. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Kirby at 12 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
43 Marvel Worldwide, Inv. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Kirby at 12 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
44 Marvel Worldwide, Inv. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v.
Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2012).
45 Allissa Wickman, High Court Urged To Review Marvel Copyright Row, Apr. 2, 2014. Law 360.
46 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2013).
47 Id. See Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 741-43.
48 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
49 Id. at 282.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 283. See also The Comic Book Wars; Captain America Creator Fights to Regain Control
of His Copyright, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2003 (showing that “Simon acknowledge[d] and
agree[d] that all his work on the Materials, and all his work which created or related to the Rights
was done as an employee for hire”).
52 Id. at 289.
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in legislative history and purpose of the statute.” 53 Further, the court stated that they
“must construct an interpretation that comports with [the statute’s] primary purpose
and does not lead to anomalous or unreasonable results.” 54 In examining the
Copyright Act of 1976, 55 the court determined that “an agreement made after a work’s
creation stipulating that the work was created as a work for hire constitutes an
‘agreement to the contrary’ which can be disavowed pursuant to the statute.” 56 In
addition, another argument raised by Toberoff in front of the Second Circuit examined
how agency law plays into the ‘work-for-hire’ doctrine. 57 In applying agency law, the
court held that the designation of the relationship is not controlling, but instead it is
how the parties act throughout their relationship that determines agency. 58
C. Argument In Favor of Petition
The final step, before analyzing the inconsistencies and faults in the ‘instance and
expense test,’ is to look at the petition for writ of certiorari and amici curiae briefs. The
first argument advanced is that the Second Circuit’s application of the ‘instance and
expense test’ is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 59 (CCNV) and with the general purpose of the 1909 Act. 60
Much like the court in Simon, the Supreme Court started its analysis by looking at the
language of the statute. 61 In analyzing the definition of ‘employee’ and ‘scope of
employment,’ the Court determined that where there is an established common law
meaning to an undefined term, “Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning to these terms.” 62 Here, the common law meaning that has been used is that
of the master-servant relationship. 63 There is nothing in the statute that suggests
Id. (citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000)). Brief for Bruce Lehman, Former
Asst. Secretary of Commerce and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; Ralph Oman,
Former U.S. Register of Copyrights; the Artists Rights Society, The International Intellectual
Property Institute as Amicus Curiae, at 11, 13. “Undefined terms in statutes must be read in
accordance with their common law definition” and that federal legislation “are generally intended to
have uniform nationwide application.” Id.
54 Id. (quoting Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States DOI, 228 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir.
2000).
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c).
56 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)).
57 Id. at 291. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 18 (Mar. 21, 2014).
58 Id. See also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 19 (2002)(stating that “the mere use of the work agent by
parties in their contract does not make one an agent who, in fact, is not such).
59 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
60 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 17 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
61 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 739.
62 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal, Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
63 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 15 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740. See, e.g., Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94
(1915)(holding that it was Congress’ intent that the word ‘employee’ and ‘employed’ take on their
natural meaning, “to describe the conventional relation of employer and employee”). Black’s Law
53
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Congress intended anything other than to mean the “conventional employment
relationship.” 64 Therefore, the court concluded that the definition of employee will be
defined by the “common law of agency.” 65
Further, the Petition contends that CCNV overruled the application of the
‘instance and expense test,’ 66 because it “impede[s] Congress’…goal…of enhancing
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.” 67 Under the ‘instance and
expense test’ “hiring parties…[can] unilaterally obtain work-made-for-hire rights
years after the work has been completed as long as they directed or supervised the
work, a standard that is hard not to meet when one is a hiring party.” 68 With hiring
parties having this power, there would be no way to tell “until late in the process, if
not until the work is completed” 69 to determine if the work was for hire under the
statute. 70 Further, the way the current law is interpreted the artist bears all the risk
and takes no reward. 71 The Petition points out that Nimmer on Copyright views CCNV
as having precedential value and thus overruled the ‘instance and expense test.’ 72

Dictionary 1402 (9th ed. 2009)(defining common law employer-employee relationship as a “masterservant” relationship).
64 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 15 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See also CCNV, 490 U.S. at
740(stating that nothing indicates that Congress intended to mean “anything other than the
conventional relation of employer and employee”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darde, 503 U.S. 318,
323 (1992)(holding that unless Congress states otherwise, it is presumed that “Congress means an
agency law definition for ‘employee’”).
65 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 741.
66 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 17 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See
CCNV, 490 U.S. at 750.
67 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989).
68 Id. at 750. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 19 (filed Mar.
21, 2014).
69 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 750. Brief for the Screen Actors Guild,
Directors Guild and Writers Guild as Amicus Curiae at 20 (filed on June 13, 2014)(stating that the
current test “by retroactively deeming commissioned works as ones ‘made for hire,’ the Second Circuit
has given the purchaser all of the copyright benefits of the employment relationship, without any of
the associated burdens…[and] completely disregarding the risk borne by the freelance creator
attendant a work’s creation in a relationship such as the one between Jack Kirby and Marvel”).
70 Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 19 (filed Mar. 21,
2014).
71 Brief for the Screen Actors Guild at 9. “The artist is wholly at the mercy of the purchaser and
stands to lose either his investment of time and resources if his work is rejected or his original
copyright if his work is accepted.” Id.
72 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 20 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See
3 NIMMER, supra note 20, at 4v(stating that “given the Supreme Court’s unambiguous direction that
the same [agency] standards govern [the] terms…‘employee,’ ‘employer,’ and ‘scope of employment,’ it
follows mathematically” that the application of these terms would be the same under the 1909 Act, as
they are under the 1976 Act, which the court in CCNV stated).
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The second argument addressed in the petition for writ of certiorari is that the
‘instance and expense test’ is wrong. 73 The case of Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. 74
incorrectly expands the ‘work-for-hire’ doctrine to include independent contractors. 75
Further, the petition posits that this test is vague and subjective. 76 The ‘instance’
prong of the test looks at “the extent to which the hiring party provided the impetus
for, participated in, or had the power to supervise the creation of the work.” 77 In
another case, the Second Circuit stated that this prong was satisfied if the hiring party
had “the right to direct and supervise” how the work was done and make “creative
contributions.” 78 However, the court also held that this right “need never be
exercised” 79 to qualify, but then stated that this right may not be enough to qualify. 80
“It may be sufficient, for example, where the hiring party makes a particularly strong
showing that the work was made at its expense.” 81 The Second Circuit’s evaluation of
this prong is continually inconsistent, thwarting Congressional intent to create
consistent results. 82
The expense prong of this test is as unpredictable as the instance prong. This
factor “refers to the resources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work,” 83
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 21 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
75 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 23 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See 3 NIMMER, supra note 20,
at 4 (explaining that based on earlier case law this decision was wrong, this case incorrectly relies on
the decisions of Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) and Yardley
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939) to hold that works of independent contractors are
works-made-for-hire, when “they point to the contrary result). See also Brief for Screen Actors Guild
at 12 (stating that “the courts conjured a test…that upset the long-standing balance between a work’s
creator and its purchaser”); Brief for Lehman at 5 (explaining that “the court of appeals retroactive
re-characterization of Kirby’s freelance work as ‘work for hire’ under the 1909 Act”).
76 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 24 (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
77 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 139 (2d Cir. 2013). See Siegel v. National
Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974)(holdings that the motivating factor is
whether the hiring party’s impetus cause the creation).
78 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 139. See also Playboy Enterprise, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 556 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating that evidence of an independent contractor receiving instructions for the work, shows
that it was work for hire); Aldon Accessories Ltd v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.
1984)(rationalizing that though the hiring party did not give the artist the tools to create a statue, “he
stood over the artists…at critical stages of the process telling them exactly what to do”).
79 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 24 (filed Mar. 21, 2014)(citing Martha Graham School
& Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d
Cir. 2004).
80 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 139. See Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914
(2d Cir. 1974)(concluding that were the contractor “revise[s] and expand[s] the…material at the
request of the” hiring party was not enough, because the contractor created the work prior to the
relationship.)
81 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 139. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir.
1969)(stating that the hiring party gave funds, time and their facility).
82 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989).
83 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 139.
73
74
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such as “tools, resources, or overhead may be controlling.” 84 Other cases focused on
the payment method and who bears the risk. 85 If this test is satisfied, the presumption
arises that the hiring party is the author. 86
III. ANALYSIS
As advanced in Kirby’s petition for writ and is apparent in the consistently
inconsistent decisions of the Second Circuit, the instance and expense test is
overbroad, vague and does not advance the policies behind the Copyright Act. 87 This
section will discuss the various cases in which the ‘instance and expense’ test was
applied and their varying verdicts.
A. ‘Instance and Expense’ and Case Law
Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler 88 and Brattleboro Pub. Co. v. Winmill
Pub. Corp. 89 are the two seminal cases establishing the ‘instance and expense test.’
The court in Lin-Brook held that without a contrary agreement, a presumption arises
that the intention of the parties was for the copyright to vest in the party whose

Id. See also Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 638 (concluding that the resources of the hiring party
significantly assisted the contractor in creating the work, “satisfying the ‘expense’ prong); 1 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(2)(D), n.171c (2004)(stating the
expense prong refers to “the expense of creation, rather than publication,” because if courts were to
examine the cost of publication, “all published material” would be covered). Contra Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d at 555 (holding that factors, such as setting hours and the use of tools, has
“no bearing on whether the work was made at the hiring party’s expense”).
85 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 140. See also Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d at 555 (holding that the
controlling factor was that the artist was “paid a fixed sum for each work…[was] sufficient to” satisfy
the expense prong); Marco v. Accent Pub. Co. Inc., 969 F.2d 1547, 1552 (3d Cir. 1992)(concluding that
“an experienced photographer who uses his own equipment; who works at his own studio, on days and
times of his choosing, without photography assistants hired by the publisher; and who receives
payment without income tax withheld, without employee benefits,” is not in an employment
relationship). Contra Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216 (opining that though relevant case law shows
that the presence of a fixed salary is one of the factors in deciding this factor, the court determined
that “the absence of a fixed salary…is never conclusive”).
86 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 140 (citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d at 556)(holding that this
presumption can only be overcome with “evidence of an agreement to the contrary”).
87 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc. at 24 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 749; Brief for Lehman at 5 (explaining that
“Congress clearly contemplated regular, salaried employment and Congress’s exhaustive research
leading up to the 1976 Act shows that certainly no one in 1958-63 construed work for hire to include
the copyrighted material of freelancers like Kirby”).
88 Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965).
89 Brattleboro Pub. Co. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
84
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instance and expense induced the work’s creation. 90 In that case, the appellant
published catalogs that contained advertisements and would copyright each catalog. 91
The advertisements in these catalogs contained the artwork of H.L. Baxter. 92 The
appellee also published similar catalogs containing the same advertisements as the
appellant’s. 93 The appellant commenced the suit alleging copyright infringement on
the advertisements. 94 The trial court held that the copyright vested in H.L. Baxter
upon creation of the drawing and therefore, the appellant’s copyright was invalid. 95
Further, there was an assignment from Baxter to Lin-Brook showing that Lin-Brook
did not have title. 96 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court’s decision
was erroneous and held that there is little distinction between an employee and
independent contractor. 97 The Ninth Circuit went on to say that the assignment was
not sufficient to show that Lin-Brook did not have title, there needed to be a contract
to overcome the presumption. 98
The Second Circuit, in Brattelboro, held that if the intent of the parties cannot be
determined, there is a presumption the copyright vests in the employer. 99 In that case,
the appellant (“the Reformer”) brought suit against the appellee (“the Town Crier”)
alleging copyright infringement, for using the same advertisements. 100 All of the
advertisements were published at the request of the advertisers. 101 The trial court
held that the Reformer did not have the rights to the work under copyright law. 102 The
Second Circuit held that the fact that there was no contract raises the presumption
that the copyright vested in the party whose ‘instance and expense’ the work was
created. 103 In examining the expense prong, the Second Circuit determined that the
advertisers paid a sum of money to the Reformer which included the costs of preparing

LinBrook, 352 F.2d at 300. See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin, Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939)
(presuming that one, who induces the creation of a publication, wishes to own and control that thing,
unless the parties contract otherwise); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D.N.Y. 1944)
(overcoming this presumption requires a contract to the contrary).
91 Lin-Brook, 352 F.2d at 299.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 300.
96 Id.
97 Id. (stating that a “presumption arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to
the copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the work is done”).
98 Id.
99 Brattleboro Pub. Co. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that “there
is a presumption in the absence of an express contractual reservation to the contrary, that the
copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the work is done”).
100 Id. at 567.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (holding that there
is an inference that the copyright of certain works vest in the employer, because they were created
employees and those employees were paid by the employer to create that work).
90
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the advertisements “form, words and illustrations.” 104 Further, the court held that the
advertisements were done at the instance of the Reformer to induce advertisers. 105
Though this court applied these factors, it did not stop after examining the ‘instance
and expense test’. It also evaluated what the equitable result would be. 106 Due to the
local businessmen’s naïve understanding of the law, it was likely that these local
businessmen thought that the money they spent gave them the rights to have
continual use of those advertisements. 107 The court held that to place this burden on
the local businessmen would be unfair. 108 Further, it would be more equitable to have
the Reformer bear the burden of making an express agreement stating that the
Reformer would have the sole ownership of copyrights to the advertisement. 109
The Second Circuit continued their application of the ‘instance and expense test’
in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. 110 That case involved the ownership of rights to
the song “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf.” 111 The appellant, Ann Ronell’s successor
in interest, argued that they owned one-half interest as joint author of the song. 112
Bourne argued that Ronell’s part was as a work for hire because the appellee
approached Ronell to create a song for a cartoon. 113 Where the motivating factor of the
works created was the inducement by an employer, it is categorized as work-for-hire. 114
The Second Circuit held the fact that Disney and Berlin, the appellee’s predecessor in
interest, approached Ronell, that they held the right “to accept, reject, or modify” the
work and that Ronell accepted payment without protest, made the song a
work-for-hire. 115

Brattelboro, 369 F.2d at 568.
Id. (stating that “the services of [the] Reformer’s advertising department were offered as an
inducement to the local businessmen to use appellant’s paper as a medium” for exposure).
106 Id. at 568.
107 Id. (stating that “it seem[ed] likely [they] were naïve with respect to the complex provisions of
the copyright law, and assumed…that the price they paid…entitled them to have the same
advertisements published elsewhere”).
108 Id. (explaining that due to the naïve understanding of the law, the local businessmen, should
not be burdened with providing these contracts).
109 Id. (concluding “it is far more equitable to require the Reformer to provide by express
agreement with the advertisers that it shall own any copyright to the advertisements”).
110 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
111 Id. at 1214.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1215.
114 Id. at 1216. (citing Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1939) (accepting
a party’s commission to paint a picture, the accepting party not only sells the artwork, but also the
rights of reproduction)).
115 Id. at 1217. The fact that there was no fixed salary and the ability to do work with other
companies was not controlling in determining if a creation was a work made for hire. Id. at 1216.
Contra Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir. 1967).
The Second Circuit held that factors such as lack of control over an independent contractor’s
performance, the contractor’s ability to sell works to others without sharing profits, and that there
was no fixed salary were controlling in determining whether a work was made for hire. Id.
104
105
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In Playboy Enters. V. Dumas, 116 the Second Circuit held that factors such as
providing one’s own materials, hiring their own personnel and paying their own taxes
and benefits are not determinative in establishing a work was not for hire. 117 The
court held, in that case, that the fact that the independent contractor was paid a fixed
amount for each work was enough to satisfy the expense requirement. 118 With regard
to the instance prong, the court stated that the art was done at the direction of Playboy
and that the fact that, after some time, Playboy seized to direct and control just showed
the evolution of the relationship. 119 The Second Circuit held that the works would not
be in existence, if it were not for Playboy’s instance. 120
The last decision this section will analyze is the Supreme Court’s decision in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 121 In that case, CCNV, a nonprofit
organization approached James Earl Reid to sculpt a bronze statue. 122 After the statue
was on display, it was returned to Reid for some repairs and was not returned. 123 Reid
then sought to copyright this statue and CCNV filed suit. 124 The District Court held
that this statue was a work-for-hire, however was later reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 125 The Court held that the control test, suggested
by CCNV, would not advance the objectives of Congress in redrafting the copyright
law. 126 In making their decision, the Court stated that the control test circumvents
the Copyright Act by classifying anything as a work-for-hire, so long as it is any
Playboy Enters. V. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 555. CCNV “may be used to show that an artist worked as an independent contractor
and not as a formal employee.” Id. However, these factors do not “have [] bearing on whether the
work was made at the hiring party’s expense.” Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 20
(citing Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. 342 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating
that the Second Circuit looks at the “review in CCNV, if dictum at all, is dictum of a weak variety”
and that CCNV is not dictum and is viewed “as overruling the ‘instance and expense’ test under both
the 1976 and 1909 Acts”)). Contra 3 NIMMER, supra note 20, at 4 (applying the agency definition of
‘employee,’ ‘employer,’ and ‘scope of employment’ to the 1909 Act logically follows the Supreme Court’s
“unambiguous direction,” in CCNV).
118 Id. While citing Brattleboro and Yardley, to state that “the expense requirement [is] met when
[the] artist was commissioned.” Id. (quoting Yardley, 108 F.2d at 31). But, at the same time, stated
that “the absence of a fixed salary…is never conclusive.” Id. (quoting Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216).
119 Id at 556.
120 Id.
121 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 735 (1989)(granting “certiorari
to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the proper construction of the ‘work made for
hire’ provision[]”). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 17 (filed Mar. 21, 2014)(stating that
CCNV overruled the application of the ‘instance and expense’ test).
122 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 733.
123 Id. at 735.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 73536.
126 Id. at 750. (holding that under this test “parties would have to predict in advance whether the
hiring party will sufficiently control a given work to make it the author)(citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476
at 124 (1976)(stating that the main objective of Congress was to enhance the “predictability and
certainty of copyright ownership”)).
116
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“specially ordered commissioned work that is subject to supervision and control of the
hiring party.” 127 Further, abiding by these tests “would unravel the carefully worked
out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests on both sides.” 128 As
previously mentioned, the Court concluded that the control test, as practiced by the
Second Circuit, will not allow parties to know who may hold the copyright until late in
the process, when one can determine whether the hiring party “closely monitored the
production process,” 129 therefore, inhibiting the Congressional goal of predictability.
B. Consistently Inconsistent Outcomes
As advanced in CCNV, the test created by the Ninth Circuit and adopted by the
Second Circuit is vague and leads to unpredictability in litigation. 130 As discussed
earlier, when applying the instance prong of this test, the Second Circuit looked at the
extent to which the hiring party had control or supervision power. 131 However, this
power need not ever be exercised, because there could be a particular showing of the
work being created at the expense of the hiring party. 132
Further, the expense prong is the most troubling and unpredictable. 133 As
discussed by Nimmer, this prong should examine the cost of the creation, “rather than
the cost of publication,” because this would make all published material
work-for-hire. 134 However, as mentioned previously, the Second Circuit has been
consistently inconsistent when deciding this factor. 135 Further, the Second Circuit
stated that though the work may not have been at the expense of the hiring party, if
the work was at their instance it would be considered a work for hire. 136 Without
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 741.
Id. at 748.
129 Id. at 750.
130 Id. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 17 (quoting Community for Creative NonViolence, 490 U.S. at 741 (“CCNV criticized this overbroad test as encompassing virtually all
contributions to books or movies because such are ‘usually prepared at the instance, direction, and
risk of a publisher or producer’”).
131 Playboy, 53 F.3d at 556.
132 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 139. See also Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 427 F.2d 497, 501 (2d Cir.
1969)(giving an independent contractor money, time and facility may be enough for a hiring party to
have the rights).
133 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25. (filed Mar. 21, 2014).
134 1 NIMMER supra note 84, at 18. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25. (filed Mar. 21,
2014)(stating that “[t]he ‘expense’ component refers to the resources the hiring party invests in the
creation of the work”).
135 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25. (filed Mar. 21, 2014)(citing Martha Graham, 380
F.3d at 638). The Second Circuit noted that there needs to be consideration of factors such as whether
“tools, resources or overhead were contributed.” Id. However, the Second Circuit later stated that
such factors should not be considered. Id.
136 See Playboy Enters. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d at 555 (hiring one’s own personnel, paying own taxes
and supplying their own materials did not control the decision, but whether it was performed at the
hiring parties instance).
127
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establishing hard set boundaries, in determining what constitutes as being at the
hiring party’s instance and expense, there will be no resolution in enhancing the
predictability of copyright litigation.
Finally, in examining the facts of Kirby’s case, it is clearly evident that the
inconsistent decisions regarding the ‘instance and expense test’ need to be resolved.
With regard to the instance prong, Justice Marshall’s opinion shows that the factors
applied by the Second Circuit are invalid because this prong would mandate that all
or most published works be deemed work-for-hire. 137 The Second Circuit held that the
fact that Kirby created characters and stories irrelevant because this creativity is what
motivated Marvel to hire Kirby. 138 However, Justice Marshall stated that the common
law rules of agency apply in such circumstances, therefore overruling prior Second
Circuit application of the instance prong. 139 The common law principles of agency treat
employees in the traditional course of employment. 140 The facts of the case show that
there was no contractual agreement between Kirby and Marvel describing the ‘scope
of employment.’ 141 Therefore, the common law doctrine mandated that Marvel obtain
the copyright through an agreement with Kirby. 142
In looking at the expense prong, this factor’s inconsistent application raises
questions on whether it was correctly applied in Kirby. 143 The Second Circuit has
See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 741 (holding that the unifying feature
of these works is that they are usually prepared at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or
producer); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 24 (stating that “publication is usually the
motivating factor and…a publisher exercises control by virtue of its economic power).
138 See Kirby, 726 F.3d at 142 (holding Kirby’s “ingenuity and acumen are [] substantial reason[s]
for [Marvel] to have enlisted him”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25 (stating that the judges
“found it irrelevant that Marvel’s most enduring characters were the product of Kirby’s creative genius
because it was only natural that ‘a hired artist indeed put his exceptional gifts to work for the party”
that hired them).
139 Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 740. There was nothing in the statute that
demonstrates that ‘employee’ was meant “to describe anything other than the conventional relation
of employer and employee. Id. at 740. The intent of encompassing the common law agency definition
is further seen Congress’ use of ‘scope of employment,’ which is “a widely used term of art in agency
law.” See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darde, 530 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)(presuming that, unless
Congress states a separate definition, the definition of employee holds its meaning in agency law); 3
NIMMER supra note 20, at 4 (applying the agency definition of ‘employee,’ ‘employer,’ and ‘scope of
employment’ to the 1909 Act logically follows the Supreme Court’s “unambiguous direction”); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby, at 19 (filed Mar.1 21, 2014).
140 See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 745 (defining “workforhire as a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his employment, but no including a work
made on special order or commission”).
141 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 14142 (stating that Kirby’s estate’s argument was that the right to supervise
referred to in [] case law requires a legal, presumably contractual, right” and Marvel had no such
right).
142 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 20 (purporting that “commissioned work of an
independent contractor is owned by the commissioning party via assignment, not as the initial author
and proprietor”).
143 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25.
137
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applied various factors to this component and determined some were conclusive, at
their convenience, and that those same factors were not determinative, at their
convenience. 144 When applying this prong to Kirby, the Second Circuit gave weight to
Marvel’s argument stating that they bore the burden of losing money on the comic’s
publication. 145 However, this is directly contradictory to the understanding of this
prong and the focus should not be the cost of publication, but the cost of creation
instead. 146 The undisputed facts of the case lead to the conclusion that these works
were done at Kirby’s expense. 147 Kirby was a freelance writer that did not receive a
fixed salary. 148 Kirby set his own hours, used his own materials and was not
reimbursed for these expenses. 149 The cost of creation should be controlling in
considering the expense prong. 150 This prong should have been decided in favor of
Kirby and not Marvel.
Further, as addressed by the Second Circuit, in Brattelboro, the equitable result
should favor those that can be considered naïve as to the law. 151 It was rationalized
that a business was in a better position to have a contract drawn up. 152 The court also
stated that to place this burden on the naïve party would be unjust and too
burdensome. 153 Therefore, with Marvel being an established business, they should
bear the burden of establishing a contract, as opposed to the small time artist, Jack
Kirby.
Not only is this test vague, it leads to inconsistent results, thwarting the intended
purpose of the Copyright Act, thus leaving issues that need to be resolved. 154
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25 (stating in Martha Graham the Second Circuit
decided that the fact that providing tools, a workspace and other resources was determinative,
however, in Playboy, the Second Circuit held those same factors “had no bearing on whether the work
was made at the hiring party’s instance”).
145 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 142. Marvel contended that paying Kirby a flat rate is determinative. Id at
142. Further, that sum was paid whether or not the comic published and therefore, bore the “risk of
financial loss.” Id. The court gave weight to this argument stating “both parties took on risks with
respect to the work’s success.” Id. at 143. But, the payment of the flat fee and bearing the risk of
monetary loss was enough for the projects to be deemed worksforhire. Id.
146 1 NIMMER, supra note 84, at 18 (“funding publication would convert a manuscript
would…subsume all published materials”). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 26. The court
concluded that the financial risk that Marvel bore that the comic may not succeed was enough. Id.
“But, ‘[p]lainly it is the expense of creation rather than publication that is relevant’” (quoting 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03(B)(2)(D), n.171c(2004)).
147 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 26 (“Kirby shouldered all expenses of creating his work
with no guarantee of repayment”).
148 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 125.
149 Id. at 126.
150 1 NIMMER, supra note 24, at 18 (explaining that “the expense of creation, rather than
publication” is the true focus of the expense prong).
151 Brattelboro Pub. Co. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See Allissa Wickman, High Court Urged To Review Marvel Copyright Row, Apr. 2, 2014. Law
360. (stating that “if the test is left standing, it will effectively destroy…the ‘inalienable authorial
144
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IV. PROPOSAL
In evaluating the inconsistent decisions of the Second Circuit, there needs to be a
consistent and concrete test developed to further the purpose of the Copyright Act.
This section will further discuss the factors used by the Second Circuit to create a
predictable test that the Supreme Court should adopt, if the writ of certiorari, for
Marvel Characters Inc. v. Kirby, is granted. In the alternative, if the Supreme Court
denies writ of certiorari, Congress should draft a new Copyright Act, as they did in
1976, to define and explain their intent. 155
A. Setting a Standard for the Future
As advanced in Lin-Brook, there should be a presumption that the parties’
intention was for the copyright to vest in the party whose instance and expense induced
the creation, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. 156 This makes sense
because when a party invests in the creation of a work, that party should be granted
the benefits of that work. 157 However, this presumption should not automatically vest
in a party just because he solicits an artist to create a work. 158 This must pass a
concrete and predictable ‘instance and expense test.’
While the instance prong of this test may seem inherently obvious, the Supreme
Court in CCNV, points out that this prong may be obsolete. 159 As the Court pointed
out, by saying that a work is a work made for hire just because it was solicited and
controlled, would make virtually everything a work made for hire and would not allow
predictability. 160 Though this position is on point, this factor is important to determine
the control of the soliciting party.
right to revoke copyright transfer’ [and] this case is of significant importance not just to…a substantial
portion of the nation’s intellectual and artistic community”).
155 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124. See Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985)(redrafting
the statute “added benefits to authors…intended to make the rewards for the creativity of authors
more substantial); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating the
ultimate goal is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”). 1 NIMMER, supra note
19, at 4(explaining that “the fruits of an author’s labor seem to be no less deserving of the privileges
and status of “property” than are the more tangible creative efforts of other laborers.”).
156 Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F. 2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). See Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939)(presuming that one, who induces the creation of
a publication, wishes to own and control that thing, unless the parties contract otherwise); Grant v.
Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp. at 51 (overcoming this presumption requires a contract to the contrary).
157 Yardley, 108 F.2d at 31. When a work is solicited and paid for, it should be presumed “the
patron desires to control the publication of copies and that the artist consents that he may.” Id.
158 Contra Brattelboro Pub. Co. v. Winmill Pub. Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966)(holding
that the presumption of copyright vestment is in favor of the employer).
159 CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741 (1989)(holding that the instance test does not advance the
objectives and intentions of Congress in creating the redrafted copyright law).
160 Id. The Court stated that the ‘instance and expense test’ would make anything a work-forhire, so long as it was a “specially ordered commissioned work that is subject to supervision and control
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The ability of a party to accept, reject or modify a work should be persuasive, but
not controlling in itself, in determining whether a work was one for hire. 161 However,
the lack of control over the creation of the work would weigh this factor in favor of the
“hired” party. 162
As previously mentioned, the results of the expense prong are the most troubling,
due to its continuous inconsistent application. 163 This factor should examine the cost
of preparation and creation, not the cost of publication. 164 This aspect of the expense
prong was once articulated as controlling, when done by the hiring party, but when the
hired party uses their own resources it was determined to have no bearing on the
result. 165 The courts should evaluate facts such as being paid a fixed salary, using
one’s own money and materials, using one’s own time, and reimbursement of moneys
spent. 166 When a party supplies materials, time and is not reimbursed, the expense
prong should weigh in favor of that party.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court needs to grant writ of certiorari to solidify
a balancing test that gives little leeway and creates predictable results. As stated in
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Kirby case “provides an ideal vehicle for [the
of the hiring party.” Id. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 17 (stating that CCNV
overruled the inconsistent application of the ‘instance and expense test’).
161 Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, 457 F. 2d 1213, 1217 (2d Cir. 1972)(holding that the ability to
control and paying a fixed salary was not controlling).
162 Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir.
1967)(stating that lack of control over an independent contractor is controlling in making the
determination).
163 See Marvel Characters Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 139 (2d Cir. 2013)(stating that the expense
prong “refers to the resources the hiring party invests in the creation of the work”); Martha Graham
School Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 638
(2d Cir. 2004)(explaining that the expense prong looks at factors, such as “tools resources or overhead
[and these factors] may be controlling”); Marco v. Accent Pub. Co. Inc., 969 F.2d 1547, 1552 (3d Cir.
1992)(holding that when a hired party uses their own equipment, their own facilities and “who
receives payment without income tax withheld [and] without employee benefits,” is not in an
employment relationship); Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216( stating that a fixed salary is merely one
fact, but the presence or “absence of a fixed salary…is never conclusive” in determining at whose
expense the work was created). Contra Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir.
1995)(concluding that factors such as setting hours, using own tools and facilities have “no bearing on
whether the work was made at the hiring party’s expense” and the fact that one is “paid a fixed sum
for each work…[was] sufficient to” satisfy the expense prong); Donaldson, 375 F.2d at 643(holding
that the absence of a fixed salary was a controlling factor in determining the expense prong).
164 1 NIMMER, supra note 84, at 18. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 25. (filed Mar. 21,
2014)(stating that “[t]he ‘expense’ component refers to the resources the hiring party invests in1 the
creation of the work”). Brattelboro, 369 F.2d at 568. (stating that the party that paid for the costs of
preparation was entitled to the copyright).
165 Martha Graham, 380 F.3d at 638(stating that when a hiring party uses their own resources
to aid the hired party it satisfies the expense prong); Contra Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 53 F.3d at
555(holding that factors, such as setting hours and the use of tools, has “no bearing on whether the
work was made at the hiring party’s expense”).
166 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 125-126. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 26.
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Supreme Court] to finally address this controversial standard.” 167 This test should
encompass the numerous factors that have been used in applying the ‘instance and
expense test,’ but with consistent results. As mentioned above, the instance prong
should still be applied, but by itself should not be controlling. 168 Courts should still
evaluate if the work was solicited and if the solicitor had control over the creation of
the work because direct supervision and control can show the amount of involvement
the hiring party had in the creation. In creating a solidified expense prong that looks
at the cost of creation, courts should look at what expenses were exhausted and who
spent that money, rather than determining that the hiring party bore the risk of losing
money after publication. 169
This test will further the intent of the Copyright Act by creating a predictable
result. Where a hired party is reimbursed for his expenditures or where that party
does not spend their own money, the expense prong would not be in their favor.
Therefore, tipping the scale in favor of the hiring party.
B. Applying the New Standard to Kirby’s Case
As previously mentioned, Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby is the perfect vehicle
for the Supreme Court to address the inconsistent decisions of the Second Circuit and
establish a test for the future. In this case, it appears that the Second Circuit applied
whichever factors it felt in coming to their decision. In applying the facts and analyzing
the test set out above, it will be clear that Kirby’s estate should have been the victors.
Jack Kirby had a continuing relationship with Marvel while he was creating these
characters and this should be a factor that courts evaluate in determining if these
works were made for hire. 170 However, unlike the Second Circuit’s decision, the
relationship should not itself be a controlling factor in determining that the works were
made for hire. 171 Further, although this was an ongoing relationship between Kirby
and Marvel, after sometime the proverbial reigns were loosened and Kirby was not
under direct and continuous supervision. 172 In weighing the facts as they are, and not

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 38.
Contra Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555 (holding that using one’s own materials, paying their own taxes
and hiring their own personnel is not controlling, if it was done at the instance of the hiring party).
169 Kirby, 726 F.3d at 142 (stating “that both parties took on risks with respect to the works’
success” but the risk Marvel took in production outweighed that of Kirby’s expenses in creating the
works). Contra 1 NIMMER, supra note 84, at 18(stating that considering the expense of production is
the incorrect factor, but the evaluation of the cost of creation).
170 Kirby, 726 F.3d 119. These creations were products of Kirby’s ongoing “overarching
relationship” with Marvel. Id at 141. Further, these works were created “with Marvel specifically in
mind” and there was an “ongoing partnership with Marvel, however unbalanced and underremunerative…, is therefore what induced Kirby’s creation of the works.” Id.
171 Id. at 143.
172 Id. at 126 (stating that “Kirby had a freer hand within [the Marvel Method} than did
comparable artists” and Kirby had an influence on the Method by changing and creating plots and
pitches).
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in the sense that the Second Circuit decided to see them, this prong of the test could
go either way.
In analyzing the expense prong, as set out, this factor will weigh in favor of Kirby.
The Second Circuit did not give credence to the facts that Kirby used his own money,
materials and his own home when creating these characters. 173 If these facts are given
the weight mandated in analyzing the cost of creation, this prong would be decided in
favor of Kirby. 174
C. Congressional Action
If the Supreme Court fails to grant certiorari, Congress needs to adapt the
Copyright Act to further the intention of creating reliable and predictable results, as
done in the past. 175 After the Supreme Court decision in Fischer v. Witmark, which
held that an author could contract away his right to renewal, Congress decided to
rewrite the legislation to assure that these rights were not transferred away. 176
In creating or adapting the law, Congress should further exude their intent of
encompassing the common law definitions of agency. 177 These definitions established
by the common law of agency stated that the scope of employment, employee, and
employer refer to the conventional employment relationship. 178 By Congress defining
these terms in a new or adapted statute, it would clarify their intentions and prevent
the confusion that the Second Circuit suffers from and would result in consistent and
predictable decisions in future cases. 179
Id. at 125126, 142. (stating that Kirby “was not a formal employee of Marvel…[and] was not
reimbursed for expenses or overhead in creating his drawings”). See also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Kirby at 1011, 26 (explaining that Kirby “was paid only for that work Marvel chose to
purchase” and that Kirby bore the risk of selling his work Marvel).
174 1 NIMMER, supra note 24, at 18. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 26 (stating
that the court “credited ‘Marvel’s expenditures over and above [what] it paid Kirby for his drawings’
and Marvel’s risk that its comic books might not be ‘successful’”).
175 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 659 (1943)(holding that the renewal
term was assignable during the initial copyright term); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124(explaining that
authors needed protection against unremunerative transfers and creating the termination of transfer
provision).
176 Fisher, 318 U.S. at 659. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (explaining that it was the
intent of Congress to benefit authors by allowing them to regain power in the extended period).
177 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 741 (explaining “that the term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of
the general common law of agency”); NLRB, 453 U.S. at 329 (holding that “Congress means to
incorporate the established meaning to these terms”).
178 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kirby at 15 (filed Mar. 21, 2014). See also CCNV, 490 U.S. at
740(stating that nothing indicates that Congress intended to mean “anything other than the
conventional relation of employer and employee”); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darde, 503 U.S. 318,
323 (1992)(holding that unless Congress states otherwise, it is presumed that “Congress means an
agency law definition for ‘employee’”).
179 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 740 (stating it is clear that where Congress does not define a term, it
intends for a term or set of words to retain their common law definition).
173
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V. CONCLUSION
As this article has discussed, it is troubling to see a continuous strain of
inconsistent decisions in the appellate court system. But, this problem is not without
resolution. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby was petitioned for writ of certiorari and it
is now up to the Supreme Court to determine whether or not to hear the case. If the
Supreme Court grants certiorari, the Court has the opportunity to make the equitable
decision and rule in favor of Kirby’s heirs. 180 However, if there is an inequitable result,
Congress must adapt the Copyright Act to further the equitable needs of the writers,
authors, and artists as is consistent with what Congress has on multiple occasions
expressed to be their intent. 181
Joe Simon once said that they “always felt [like] ‘we wuz robbed’” and to correct
this injustice there needs to be change. 182

Brattelboro, 369 F.2d at 568 (holding that it is far more equitable to require an established
business to contract with another with regard to copyright vestment).
181 See generally Brief for Lehman at 21. “If the court of appeals unsupportable decision is allowed
to stand, Congress’ twice expressed intent to give authors and their families the benefit of its copyright
term extensions, will be nullified.”
182 George Gene Gustines, A Creator of Captain America, Fighting On, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/books/16gust.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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